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CASE NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RESTRICTION ON
BAIL GRANTING POWER OF SUPREME
COURT HELD INVALID
Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court of South Carolina for a writ
of habeas corpus to secure his release on bail pending appeal from a
rape conviction for which a fourteen-year sentence had been imposed.
The defendant did not make a direct application for bail to the trial
judge because of a South Carolina statute which forbade post-conviction bail where the sentence exceeded ten years.' The contention of
the petitioner was that under the South Carolina Constitution,2 the
Supreme Court has inherent power to admit to bail one convicted of
a crime in the exercise of its habeas corpus powers. The court decided,
two justices dissenting, that it had an inherent power to grant bail which
could not be abrogated by the legislature, and ordered that defendant
be admitted thereto. State v. Whitener, 81 S.E. 2d 784 (S.C., 1954).
The majority of the court reasoned that while lesser state courts were
bound by the prohibition of the statute, the Supreme Court, as the constitutional court, has the inherent power to set bond in any case either
before or after conviction, and that the legislature may not abridge the
habeas corpus and bail granting powers given the Supreme Court under
the Constitution.
Attempting to justify their reasoning historically, the majority of the
court pointed to the case of State v. Satterwhite,3 which was decided by
the court according to common law principles. In that case, it was held
that a circuit judge had the power to admit a defendant to bail in all
cases, even during pendency of an appeal after conviction.
The next case relied upon by the majority was State v. Farris,4 wherein
the court was confronted for the first time with the Act of 1887, 5 which
provided that neither a circuit judge nor a supreme court justice could
lawfully grant bail pending an appeal, to any person convicted of an
offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or any term exceeding
ten years. The petitioner in that case was sentenced to a term of ten
years and one month and sought release on bail pending his appeal under
a writ of habeas corpus. The state resisted on the grounds that the court
was without authority, since punishment exceeded ten years. In granting
I S.C. Code (1952) §§ 7 and 8.
2 Art. V, § 4 provides that "The supreme court shall have power to issue writs
• . . of habeas corpus. .... "
3

20 S.C. 536 (1883).

451 S.C. 176, 28 S.E. 308 (1897).

5 The Act of 1887 was omitted from the 1952 Code and is therefore no longer law.
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the writ, the court cited the provision in the Constitution,6 granting to
the Supreme Court the power to issue writs, including habeas corpus,
and then stated that it was the legislative intent to restrict the granting
of bail by individual judges, leaving such bail-granting functions only to
the Supreme Court sitting en banc. With this interpretation, the court
skillfully avoided the question of abridgement of a constitutional power
of the Supreme Court.
The instant case meets head on the constitutional question of whether
the legislature could take away the court's power to grant bail. The
majority felt that lesser courts were bound by the statute, but not the
court of last resort. In very strong language, the majority concluded
by stating:
This court has the power to issue these writs and orders referred to in the

Constitution. These fundamental remedies and safeguards upon which each
individual in our society has the right to rely must be preserved by the courts.
Otherwise, these procedural rights embodied in our Constitution to insure the
individual against oppression will become nullities. This court, the judicial
body of last resort in our state system of jurisprudence, has the inherent power

to set bond in any case. Every defendant sentenced to ten years or less has the
right to bail pending appeal. This court can grant bail, in its discretion, where
the sentence exceeds ten years. 7

The vigorous dissent contended, as the court held in the case of In re
Ferguson," that: "After a defendant is convicted of a felony, there is no
constitutional or statutory right to bail." 9 It was also pointed out that
a statute similar to the one here in question had been upheld as constitutional in another jurisdiction in the case of Ex Parte Herndon.10 But
in no case had it been contended, as in the instant case, that when
granting bail, the writ of habeas corpus may be employed to override the
statutes. The dissent further stated that the main purpose of the writ is
to secure the liberty of one who is illegally detained. While bail is an
incidental use thereof, the power residing in the Supreme Court as to
bail is merely the common law power left to the court after the Satterwhite and Farris cases, which power has been lawfully restricted by the
statute in question. The dissent concludes: "The fact that this court is a
court of last resort adds nothing to its power with reference to bail."'"
Under the common law, bail pending an appeal from a conviction was
not granted as a matter of right. 12 The courts granted bail only upon a
showing of probable error which would call for reversal of the judgment.
6

South Carolina Const. Art. V, § 4.

9

Ibid., at 122 and 793.

781 S.E. 2d 784, 786 (S.C., 1954).

1018 Okla. Cr. 68, 192 Pac. 820 (1920).

8235 N.C. 121, 68 S.E. 2d 792 (1952).

1181 S.E. 2d 784, 788 (S.C., 1954).

v. Waddington, 1 East 143, 102 E.R. 56 (1800); Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527,
98 E.R. 327 (1770).
12 Rex
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The King's Bench had the power to admit a defendant to bail after, as
well as before, conviction, as pointed out in Hurd on Habeas Corpus: la
Bail is only proper where it stands indifferent whether the party be guilty
or innocent of the accusation against him, as it often does before trial, but
where that
difference is removed, it would, generally speaking, be absurd to
bail him. 14
State courts have uniformly taken the view that the constitutional provisions, to the effect that all persons shall be admitted to bail except for
capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great,
have to do with right to bail before trial, and do not confer a right to
bail pending an appeal from a conviction. 15 In thus concluding, the courts
state that it is not illogical to restrict or deny the right to bail pending
appeal from conviction, because prior to conviction, one charged with
a crime is clothed with a presumption of innocence. However, these
courts go on to say that the presumption of innocence is rebutted by a
verdict of guilty, and there then arises the presumption that the conviction is just and the defendant guilty.' 6 Constitutional provisions for
the freedom preserving remedies of bail and habeas corpus were prompted by the recognition of abuses in pre-trial confinement of the accused
7
rather than to aid those clearly convicted after a trial.1
The federal courts agree with state courts and their interpretation
of the constitutional provision for bail by holding that bail pending
appeal from conviction is not a matter of right.' 8
In Illinois, the state constitution sets forth the standard guarantee that
all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except in cases involving
capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great. 19
This constitutional provision and a statute to the same effect 20 guarantee
the right to bail before conviction.
Another statute provides that on appeal from a conviction for a bailable offense, when the court is of the opinion that there is reasonable
cause for believing that the judgment will be reversed, it shall be the
13 Hurd, Habeas Corpus, p. 430 (2d ed. 1876).
14Ibid., at 431.
15 Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 48 S.D. 378, 204 N.W. 999 (1925).
16 Parker v. State Highway Dept., 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E. 2d 382 (1953).
17Ex Parte Herndon, 18 Okla. Cr. 68, 192 Pac. 820 (1920).
Is Fed. Prac. & Proc. Vol. 4, § 2503, Rule 46(a) (2) relating to bail upon review.
U.S. v. Motlow, 10 F. 2d 657 (C.A. 7th, 1926) where in a statement drafted by
the senior circuit judges in conference upon call of the Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court which included the declaration: "the right of bail after conviction
is not a matter of constitutional right."

19 M. Const. Art. II, Sec. 7.
20111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 38, § 609.
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duty of the judge to admit the defendant to bail until the determination
of a writ of error.21 This statute restates the common law rule and
makes no attempt to restrict the exercise of judicial discretion.
Generally, the states do not legislate on the question of bail after
conviction, but leave such questions to the sound discretion of the courts.
Practically all decisions have been concerned with whether the prisoner
has the right to bail after conviction, and not whether the court has the
power to grant bail if it so desires.. The court in the Ex Parte Herndon
case 22 upheld a statute similar to South Carolina's as being constitutional.
It should be remembered, however, that in the instant case, the court
stated that the lower courts of the state are bound by the statute, and
that only the Supreme Court, by virtue of its constitutional authority, is
above the statute. The court agreed with the general rule that the convicted man has no right to bail, but it maintained that the discretionary
power of the Supreme Court to allow bail cannot be hampered by legislation.
Thus the Supreme Court has made the granting of bail after conviction a function of the court, reserving under the doctrine of separation
of powers this power to them alone, not to be regulated by the legislature. This constitutional reservation of the bail question to the Supreme
Court seems to be a unique view as to the control of bail in American
constitutional law.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-WIFE'S REMARRIAGE
AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATES ALIMONY
On October 8, 1945, plaintiff obtained a decree of divorce. Plaintiff
was awarded custody of four children and defendant was ordered to pay
$125.00 per month for support of plaintiff and the children. Soon after,
plaintiff left the state with the children, and a year later remarried. Plaintiff tried to conceal her second marriage from defendant. He, however,
learned of it, and went to see plaintiff and the children. At this time plaintiff told defendant that she wished no further support and told him to
take the children. From that date until the commencement of this action,
defendant had custody of the children most of the time. Also, from the
date of plaintiff's refusal of further support, defendant has paid only for
the support of one or more children when they were with their mother.

Plaintiff instituted this proceeding to compel defendant to pay all the
arrears of alimony. The trial court awarded plaintiff a small portion of
the amount she sought. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed, holding
21
22

IlI. Rev. Star. (1953) c. 38, § 774.
18 Oka. Cr. 68, 192 Pac. 820 (1920).

